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GenAI Application
Security Assessment.

Test what your AI can access, reveal and execute.
Manual adversarial testing across prompts, retrieval and connected tools.

Discuss your AI application
GenAI trust boundary diagram: user prompts and retrieved content enter orchestration; model outputs require validation and tool calls require authorization before reaching business systems.
The model is one component.We assess the application controls that connect it to your data and business operations.

WHERE SECURITY BOUNDARIES FAIL

A convincing answer.
An unauthorized outcome.

We test whether manipulated inputs become unauthorized disclosures, actions or downstream execution.

ATTACK SURFACEWHAT WE TESTOWASP LLM / 2025

Prompt injection

Direct prompts and instructions embedded in retrieved content that redirect application behavior.

LLM01Prompt Injection

Retrieval access

RAG retrieval that returns documents outside the requesting user's permitted corpus.

LLM08Vector and Embedding Weaknesses

Agent authority

Tool calls that exceed delegated permissions or bypass required approval for sensitive actions.

LLM06Excessive Agency

Output execution

Generated content passed into HTML, queries or commands without appropriate validation.

LLM05Improper Output Handling

Sensitive data

Secrets, personal data or restricted context disclosed through responses, memory or connected tools.

LLM02Sensitive Information Disclosure

Resource abuse

Missing token, request or agent-loop limits. Validation uses agreed budgets and stop conditions.

LLM10Unbounded Consumption

Selected test areas, not an exhaustive checklist. Supply-chain exposure, poisoning paths and deployment controls are included when relevant to scope.

ENGINEER-LED ADVERSARIAL ASSESSMENT

Follow the behavior.
Verify the consequence.

Assessment loop: form a hypothesis, exercise the application, inspect traces and confirm impact. Observations refine the next test; confirmed cases inform remediation and regression retesting.
ESTABLISH THE TEST CONDITIONS

Define the attacker.
Instrument the application.

Agree roles, data boundaries, permitted actions and stop conditions. Use test accounts, seeded documents and tool traces where access permits.

MEASURE OBSERVABLE EFFECTS

A jailbreak is a lead.
Impact needs evidence.

Correlate responses with retrieved records and executed tool calls. Record repeated attempts, success conditions and model configuration.

Black-box or assisted access

Source, retrieval logs and orchestration traces improve root-cause analysis. Access limitations are recorded in the coverage statement.

WHAT YOUR TEAM RECEIVESA reproducible security finding.

  • Input & conversation state
  • Tool / retrieval evidence
  • Impact & prerequisites
  • Fix guidance & retest cases

REFERENCED FRAMEWORKS

Standards with
a defined purpose.

We select references for the system being assessed and document the version, applicable controls and coverage gaps.

OWASP LLM Top 10 APPLICATION RISK TAXONOMY
Map relevant findings to the 2025 risk categories shown above.
MITRE ATLAS ADVERSARY BEHAVIOR
Inform threat hypotheses and relevant AI attack techniques.
NIST AI RMF RISK CONTEXT / AI 600-1
Use the Generative AI Profile to inform risk discussions, evaluation context and recommendations.
CIS Benchmarks SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE
Reference applicable configuration guidance when cloud, container or host hardening is in scope.

Framework references guide the assessment; they do not constitute certification or a full AI governance audit.

START WITH YOUR ARCHITECTURE

Bring the system.
We'll define the test.

Scope a GenAI assessment

USEFUL FOR THE FIRST DISCUSSION

  • 01Application flow & model providers
  • 02Data sources & retrieval permissions
  • 03Agent tools & approval boundaries
  • 04Test environment & permitted access

Copilots · Enterprise search · Customer assistants · Tool-using agents